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ABSTRACT. This study examines interrelated connections of corporate governance, ownership
structure, and credit ratings. From the agency relationship perspective, the study analyzes this
multiple association by accounting for firm-specific and ownership characteristics for the
period between 1990 and 2007. In this context, logistic functions are used in regression models
to predict the probable outcomes of these multiple relationships. Primary findings of this study
revealed that hospitality firms with higher anti-takeover provisions (less shareholder power)
enjoy higher credit ratings. Findings also revealed high coefficients of Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003) index (the GIM index), suggesting that hospitality firms have strong governance
provisions, reduced agency conflicts, and higher chances of getting better credit ratings.

distribution shifts downward or as the variance
of its future cash flows increases, the probability
of default increases, leading to the eventual
decline of the firm’s credit rating (AshbaughSkaife, Collins, & LaFond, 2006). Public
corporations are required to have corporate
governance practices and financial disclosure
procedures in place to receive a credit rating.
Therefore, credit ratings are assigned to
corporate bonds (debt issuances), which
determine firms’ credit quality and likelihood
of default. Credit ratings are denominated with
letter designations.1
It is worthwhile to mention an essential
caveat of the corporate governance and
ownership structure of the hospitality industry.
Our motivation is to examine governance
practices of hospitality firms because those

INTRODUCTION
The concept of corporate governance
emerged as a way to monitor agency conflict
and to balance stakeholder interest. This
concept is vital for maintaining management
oversight, creating stable agency relationships,
providing access to capital, assuring effective
economic growth and strong financial performance, and improving risk management. Strong
governance practices lead to improved credit
ratings and economic prosperity. Conversely,
weak governance and poor execution of
managerial strategies can impair the financial
position and market value of firms, which, in
turn, can leave debt stakeholders (i.e., bondholders) unguarded to negative returns and
vulnerable to credit risks (FitchRatings, 2004).
A firm’s creditworthiness is determined by
evaluating the likelihood of its future cash flows.
Future expected cash flows must be sufficient
to cover debt service costs as well as principal
payments. As the mean of future cash flow

1
In our article, we used long-term issuer credit ratings
compiled by Standard & Poor’s extensive credit rating analysis.
Letter designations for different credit ratings are demonstrated in
Table 2 in detail.

Address correspondence to Murat Kizildag, PhD, MBA, Rosen College of Hospitality Management, University of Central Florida, 9907
Universal Blvd., Orlando, FL 32819, USA. Email: murat.kizildag@ucf.edu
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firms have weak shareholder rights, which
makes it different from the firms in other
industries (i.e., government regulated utility
firms with almost zero leverage). In addition, it
is a unique industry where firms are highly
levered given the enormous amounts invested
in fixed assets, high proportions of capital
expenditures, volatile operational risk structure,
heightened borrowing costs, fluctuating free
cash flow, and low levels of operating margins
and cash holdings (i.e., Kizildag, 2015; Sheel,
1998; Upneja & Dalbor, 2001). Hence, cost of
capital (especially cost of debt) and bond
issuances play an important role for the
hospitality firms in terms of their credit rating
analysis. Furthermore, the ownership composition and characteristics vary across hospitality
firms. Institutional ownership proportions vary
between 20 to 98% in those firms (Oak &
Dalbor, 2010). Taken all together, assessing the
relation between corporate governance structure and hospitality firms’ credit ratings
becomes even more critical. The primary
purpose of this article is to understand the
influence of corporate governance on hospitality firms’ credit ratings by establishing ownership characteristics with the GIM index along
with the firm-specific proxies.
Prior literature often ignores the interest of
different stakeholders, especially debtholders,
in governance and credit rating analyses.
Therefore, our article extends the existing
empirical evidences on corporate governance
and credit ratings by providing an economic
outlook and practical understanding for highly
levered, capital-intensive industry. By this way,
we aim to observe the discrepancies and
similarities with the mainstream findings.
This article is organized as follows: The
second section reviews the evidences and
findings relevant to the corporate governance
properties and their influence on credit ratings.
The third section presents methodological
procedures for our analysis. The fourth section
includes the empirical results and discusses the
findings. The fifth section concludes the article
with the discussions. The final section supplies
limitations, implications, and future research
directions.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PROPERTIES AND CREDIT RATING
The correlation between firms’ credit
ratings and corporate governance has been
extensively exhausted by previous studies using
several different governance attributes, such as
shareholder claims and rights, blockholders or
institutional investors, takeover issues, ownership structure (i.e., Gordon & Pound, 1993;
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Jensen, 1993;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). A good fraction of
these studies found a strong positive relation
between corporate governance and credit
ratings (i.e., Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006; Cremers
& Nair, 2005; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003).
However, others have documented mixed
findings or no relation in this context (i.e.,
Bhagat & Black, 2001; Demsetz & Villalonga,
2001). This issue has also drawn some attention
in financial management research in the
hospitality industry. Nevertheless, those
research attempts have focused on limited
aspects of corporate governance, such as (a)
executive compensation (Gu & Choi, 2004;
Guillet & Mattila, 2010; S. Kim & Kim, 2011);
(b) ownership structure (H. S. Kim, 2010;
Tang, Xi, Chen, & Wang, 2006); (c) managerial
ownership (Chen, Hou, & Lee, 2012; Paek,
Xiao, Lee, & Song, 2013); and (d) board of
directors’ size, involvement, and independence
(Guillet & Mattila, 2010; Keiser, 2002; Oak &
Iyengar, 2009). In this study, we have attempted
to extend the previous work by establishing the
empirical link among corporate governance,
ownership structure, and credit ratings from the
debtholders perspective by focusing on GIM
index and firm-specific measures.
Ownership Characteristics
The influence that certain shareholders can
exert on management is one of the most essential
key areas of corporate governance. Owners
with large equity ownership in the firm have a
great degree of independence (i.e., block owners
and institutional owners). They often use an
unbiased approach and they have enough
power to put pressure on management under
certain corporate situations (Ashbaugh-Skaife
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et al., 2006; Jensen, 1993). Thus, block owners
establish positive relationships with bondholders
and managements in relation to a firm’s credit
rating. This is because shareholders can benefit
from long-term debt with lower cost, and thus,
block owners might have motivation to protect
bondholders’ interests (Anderson, Mansi, &
Reeb, 2004). Similar to this conjecture, institutional owners provide better monitoring
activities by creating management disciplining,
which benefits all stakeholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al., 2006).
Operational Characteristics
(Firm Performance)
Prior research has documented a strong link
between governance best practices and
improved operating and financial performance
for companies and shareholders (i.e., Black et al.,
2006; Gompers et al., 2003; Bhojraj &
Sengupta, 2003). Therefore, we capture the
influence of operational characteristics on credit
ratings with eight firm-specific variables in this
article.
Credit ratings have a direct connection
with firm-specific financial indicators, and they
substantially affect firms’ market value. Although
there are many advantages of having high levels
of leverage, such as tax savings and reduced cost
of capital, most often high leverage limits new
investment opportunities and increases financial distress and credit risk (DeAngelo & Masulis,
1980; Hsu & Jang, 2008; H. Kim, Gu, & Mattila,
2002; Shivdasani & Zenner, 2005).
According to Himmelberg and Morgan
(1995), capital-intense firms enjoy easier access
to debt markets because fixed capital is easier
to be acquired by them, it is favorable to the
outside investors, and it is less subject to agency
problems. Firms with higher capital intensity
have lower risk of default and achieve higher
credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006).
Also, on the basis of the cost reduction
argument, high capital intensity hospitality
firms may reduce the level of operating costs
and collateral (Lee, Koh, & Kang, 2011; Sheel,
1994).
Firm size is one of the most widely used
variables in finance and economics literature

7

because of its effect on the firms’ operational
performance and financial outcome (Bonaccorsi, 1992; Evans, 1987). Avramov, Chordia,
Jostova, and Philipov (2007) used firm size to
approximate information asymmetry in credit
ratings. There are also several other studies in
hospitality industry research that used firm size
as a control variable when testing the capital
structure (i,e., Hsu & Jang, 2008; Lee, Singal, &
Kang, 2012). On the basis of the arguments
regarding firm size, we can conclude that its
effects on governance and credit ratings cannot
be avoided.
According to Treacy and Carey (2000),
interest coverage is one of the debt characteristics that is used to assess borrower’s loan
payoff ability and it is heavily used by most of
the credit rating agencies (Drury, 1981). Higher
interest coverage indicates that it is easier for
firms to cover interest payments, and thus, it
puts the firms away from the default risk zone.
If any particular firm constantly realizes
negative net income, it could be a sign that
firms might characterize financial distress in
their operations (Allayannis & Mozumdar,
2004). This will create problems for debt
repayment, and it could be factored into the
firms’ credit rating assessment.
Fama (1971) stated that there is a relation
between the risk and the expected return on
assets. A lower return on assets is associated
with lower operational performance and vice
versa. In relation with the risk and return tradeoff, we use beta as a measure of systematic risk
in our regressions. A higher beta value indicates
an increased level of risk and it could reduce
the credit ratings of a firm (Bhojraj & Sengupta,
2003).
Rauh and Sufi (2010) found that firms with
lower credit quality use a considerably higher
fraction of secured and subordinated debt.
Alali, Anandrajan, and Jiang (2012) also
argued that firms with a subordinated debt
(junior debt) are considered riskier because of
differential claims made to assets (i.e., a junior
debt that is not paid until the senior debts
are paid in full). Thus, subordinated debt
mostly has an inverse relation with firms’
credit ratings.
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Shareholder’s Rights and Agency
Relations
In recent years, laws and corporate governance practices have been built in support of
greater shareholder rights when compared with
the governance practices in the past decade.
The fair balance of rights and effective
communication between the agents and
stakeholders (equity and debt holders) are the
key for the agents to maintain critical financial
and operational attributes in the corporations,
such as firm value, shareholder value, and
financial risk. Gompers and colleagues (2003)
found that a democracy portfolio (GIM index #
5, strong shareholder rights) outperformed a
dictatorship portfolio (GIM index $ 14, weak
shareholder rights) by 8.50% suggesting that
higher shareholder rights will lower the
opportunistic management style, thus increasing the firm value.
Bad governance raises many red flags
especially between shareholders and bondholders (i.e., disparity in the balance of power
among different types of holders). Lenders and
shareholders may have different preferences in
regard to firms’ corporate governance practices
and some governance provision could affect
different parties differently (Bradley, Dallas,
Snyderwine, & Chen, 2009; Dann & DeAngelo,
1983). For example, greater shareholder power
could benefit shareholders at the expense of
bondholders.
In this vein, risk shifting and wealth transfer
between shareholders and bondholders can
be problematic, and they can deteriorate the
agency relations resulting from strategic managerial decisions. Bondholders’ might be worse
off because whenever managers invest in riskier
projects that increase the variance of a firm’s
future cash flows, they have limited upside
potential and high risk because of limited
liability, and they bear most of the cost
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Fitch Ratings,
2004; Fama & Miller, 1972; Klock, Mansi, &
Maxwell, 2005). In addition, in a takeover
scenario, the motivation for shareholder
approval could be due to the potential wealth
transfer from bondholders to shareholders.

During a harsh takeover situation, obtaining
additional debt to finance new investments may
transfer some of the wealth from bondholders to
shareholders, which create high shareholder’s
power because of lack of antitakeover provisions. Hence, it could increase the agency cost
of debt (Almazan & Suarez, 2003; Klock et al.,
2005; Stein, 1988). In contrast, managers can
sometimes favor the debtholders. With the
decision to implement antitakeover measures,
they might focus on job protection to reduce
their human capital risk, which, in turn, could
reduce firm risk, cash flow variation, and thus,
fixed long-term earnings for the bondholders
(Klock et al., 2005).
METHOD
Data and Sampling Procedures
We used a wide array of data sources.
Table 1 lists the definitions and measurements of
all the variables used in the regression models.
Firm-specific variables were gathered from
COMPUSTAT/CRSP merged files.2 We used the
quarterly data, which were collected from
Thomson Reuters (13f). Arithmetic average of
those quarterly reports was calculated for the
ownership variables. Long-term credit ratings
were obtained from the S&P’s long-term credit
ratings for the time window between 1990 and
2007.3 The credit ratings of the firms vary from
AAA (the highest rating) to D (the lowest rating,
indicating debt in default). Firms’ credit ratings
follow a non-linear relationship, particularly
between A to BBB categories and BBB to BB
categories. This nonlinearity forced us to use
ordered logistic regression (proportional odds
model), dividing ratings into investment and
noninvestment grade. Because of this nonlinearity issue, credit ratings have been
collapsed into two categories as “investment
grade” and “speculative grade” to determine
2
We construct our sample based on the Security Industry
Classification (SIC) identification system falling under the codes of
5812 (eating places: restaurants), 7990 (amusement and
recreation: casinos/gaming), and 7011 (hotels and motels).
3
S&P’s long-term credit ratings are taken from https://www.
standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/504352
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Variable

Definition

Rating
GIM index
Firm-specific factors
Lev
CapInt
Size
IntCov
Loss
ROA
Beta
Subord
Ownership characteristics
Block
InstOwners
InstOwnPer

Measurement

S&P long-term credit rating
A proxy for antitakeover provisions

S&P’s Long-Term Issuer Credit Ratings
Index from the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute

Leverage (debt level)
Capital intensity
Firm size in terms of total assets
Interest coverage ratio
Operating loss (net loss)
Returns generated on the assets
Systematic risk coefficient
Subordinated debt

[(Long-term Debt þ Short-term Debt) / Total Assets]
(Property, Plant, & Equipment / Total Assets)
Ln(Total Assets)
(Income Before Depreciation / Interest Expense)
Dummy: “1”: Net Income ¼ 0, “0”: Otherwise
(Net Income / Total Assets)
(Covariance of Market Return / Variance of Market Return)
Dummy: “1”: Subordinated Debt, “0”: Otherwise

Block owners
Institutional owners
Institutional owner proportions

Number of shareholders with at least 5% ownership
Number of institutional owners with an equity ownership
Percentage of total institutional owners with an equity ownership

Note. Beta variable is derived from Fama French & Liquidity Factors from CRSP files. GIM index is gathered from Investor
Responsibility Research Center Institute. Ownership characteristics are compiled from Thomson Reuters (13f) files. The remaining variables
are taken from COMPUSTAT—Capital IQ fundamentals.

firms’ credit ratings by using the logistic
regression analysis. Firms’ credit rating assessment falls into seven categories as reported in
Table 2.
The data for governance provisions and
ownership characteristics were compiled from
the Investor Responsibility Research Center and
the GIM index measurements. Gompers and
colleagues (2003) constructed the GIM index
on 24 equally weighted 24 governance
provisions. These provisions range from 0 to
24. The GIM index considers antitakeover

provisions for firms’ power-sharing relationships
between management and stakeholders. Total
score depends on the number of provisions that
promote antitakeover measures, which reduce
shareholder power. The provisions were
classified into one of five categories as follows:
1. Delay: It is the tactic for delaying hostile
bidders.
2. Voting: It is the voting rights.
3. Protection: It covers director/officer
protection.

TABLE 2. Standard & Poor’s Long-Term Issuer Credit Ratings

Category
AAA
AA
A
BBB
BB
B
CCC
CC
R
SD and D

Credit-worthiness
Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments
Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments
Strong capacity to meet financial commitments but somewhat more susceptible to
the adverse effects of changes in circumstances
Adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments, adequate to the lowest
investment grade
Significant speculative characteristics, least degree of speculation, noninvestment
grade speculative
Highly speculative and vulnerable
Extremely speculative and more vulnerable than “B”
Virtual certainty of default. Little chance of recovery, extremely vulnerable
Under regulatory supervision owing to its financial condition
In default

Assigned
credit score

Investment/
speculative grade

7
7
6

1
1
1

5

1

4

0

3
2
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

Note. Standard & Poor’s long-term credit ratings are taken from https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/
sourceId/504352. Investment grade is labeled as “1” and indicates the low risk of default for a bond. Speculative grade is labeled as “0” and
is the higher risk of default of a bond. Assigned credit score is also reported on COMPUSTAT Data (280).
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4. Other: It counts the other takeover
measures.
5. State: It is the state laws.
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We used ordered logistic and logistic regression
approaches to examine the influence of corporate governance on hospitality firms’ credit ratings.
The empirical model to test the hypothesis that
credit rating is explained as a function of
antitakeover provisions, ownership, and selected
control variables, is defined as follows:
Credit Rating ¼ f ðantitakeover provisions;
ownership; control variablesÞ
ð1Þ
Our initial sample included 389 firms. However,
our sample went through several elimination
processes, such as the deletion of the firms that
have missing data for both financial variables and
several GIM index factors. Thus, our final
unbalanced panel data contains 135 firm/year
observations from 33 hospitality firms.4
Firm-Specific Performance
Characteristics
We have quantified firm-specific proxies in
order to better assess the operational connection between corporate governance and firm’s
credit ratings. We subsequently discuss how we
operationalize these control variables:
Firm’s Leverage (Lev): The higher the debt in a
firm’s capital structure, the higher the
probability that the firm might have problems
in servicing debt obligations to the creditors
(Bolton & Scharfstein, 1996). Thus, to see the
effect of leverage on both capital structure and
corporate governance, we derived the leverage proxy as the ratio of total debt to total
assets.
LeverageðLevÞ ¼ ½ðLong-term Debt þ Shortterm DebtÞ=Total Assets
ð2Þ
4

The breakdown of our final sample is as follows: 13
restaurants, 9 hotels, and 11 casinos and casino hotels.

Capital Intensity (Capint): Firm’s capital
intensity was calculated using Stickney and
McGee (1983) approach. This approach
suggests the nature of the relation between
capital intensity and credit rating to be
positive.
Capital Intensity ðCapintÞ ¼ ðProperty; Plant;
& Equipment=Total AssetsÞ
ð3Þ
Size: Following Hall and Weiss’s (1967)
approach, we estimated this variable as the
logarithmic form of total assets. Our intention
was to reduce the variation of significant assets
across the hospitality firms in our sample.
Interest Coverage Ratio (Intcov): The ability
of covering the interest expenses is an
important determinant for firms’ credit rating
assessment. It demonstrates firms’ ability to
cover the interest portion of their liabilities
(J. E. Kim, 2008; Singh, 2012). Hence, the
interest coverage ratio is included in our
regressions. This variable is calculated using
the Ahn and Walker (2007) approach as
follows:
Interest Coverage ðIntCovÞ ¼ ðIncome Before
Depreciation=Interest ExpenseÞ
ð4Þ
Net Income/Loss: Dummy structure is utilized
for this variable and “1” is assigned if net
income is negative and “0” if otherwise in
the prior year.
Return on Assets (ROA): We estimate ROA as
the ratio of net income to total assets as follows:
ROA ¼ ðNet Income=Total AssetsÞ

ð5Þ

Beta: It is measured by covariance coefficient of
firm’s market return divided by the variance of
the market return.
Subordinated debt (subord): “1” is assigned if
the firm has subordinated debt and “0” if
otherwise.
Ownership Characteristics: We also consider
the following ownership factors in our
regressions to reflect the importance of
hospitality firms’ credit ratings.
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Block Owners (block): Block owners represent a
segment of large shareholders who hold at least
5.00% ownership of outstanding equity.
Institutional Owners (InstOwners): Institutional
owners represent the total number of institutional owners that have equity ownership in
the firm. We also used quarterly Thomson
Reuters (13f) data for this variable.
Institutional Owners Percentage (InstOwnerPer):
Institutional owners’ percentage represents total
institutional ownership as a percentage of the
institution’s shares outstanding.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Descriptive Analysis
Table 3 presents the selected descriptive
statistics. Overall, the hospitality industry has
a mean credit rating score of 4.48 between
speculative and lower medium grade, and a
mean value of 10.06 points in the GIM index.
Clustering hospitality firms into sub-sectors,
TABLE 3. Selected Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Overall descriptive results
Variable
M
SD
Rating
GIM index
Lev
Capint
Size
Intcov
Loss
Return on asset
Beta
Subord
Block
InstOwners
InstOwnPer

4.48
10.06
0.44
0.94
3.35
6.63
0.09
0.05
1.09
0.42
1.87
191.26
0.63

0.93
2.81
0.21
0.26
0.49
6.11
0.29
0.06
0.49
0.50
1.29
149.66
0.18

Minimum

Maximum

2.00
3.00
0.10
0.11
2.40
0.29
0.00
20.16
0.14
0.00
0.00
20.00
0.20

7.00
15.00
1.53
1.44
4.46
33.06
1.00
0.37
2.73
1.00
7.00
833
0.98

Panel B: Credit rating and GIM index for the subsectors of the
hospitality industry
Credit rating
GIM index
Lodging
Restaurant
Casinos

4.62
4.68
4.17

9.91
10.14
10.08

Note. We construct our sample based on the Security Industry
Classification (SIC) identification system falling under the codes
of 5812 (eating places: restaurants), 7990 (amusement and
recreation: casinos/gaming), and 7011 (hotels and motels).
Gompers and colleagues (2003) constructed the GIM index on 24
equally weighted 24 governance provisions ranging from 0 to 24.

11

restaurant industry achieved the highest mean
GIM index of 10.14 while lodging industry
had the lowest mean GIM index of 9.91.
Restaurant firms seem to enjoy higher credit
ratings of 4.68 (lower medium/adequate to
lowest investment grade), and casinos had the
lowest credit ratings of 4.17 (noninvestment/
speculative grade). These results remark that
the casino industry is considered as the riskiest
investment for the bondholders. Of the
selected time period and firms, there was no
firm with a credit rating of 1 (“CC”, “C”, and
“D” indicating default or little chance of
recovery). Also, none of the hospitality firms
earned an “AAA” rating from S&P long-term
issuer credit rating chart. In terms of the
chance of default, most of the restaurants had
lower leverage ratios compared with the
casinos and higher interest coverage ratio.
In regard to the return aspect, overall ROA
figures varied from 2 16.00% to 37.00%
showing the high return fluctuations generated
by firms’ assets.
Table 4 reports the correlations between
each of the selected firm-specific proxies and
the firms’ credit rating. The highest positive
correlation was found between the firms size
and the institutional owners (0.77 and the
correlation is significant at p , 0.001).
Besides those variables, “ROA”, “Intcov”,
and “GIM” were also positively correlated
with “Rating” variable. Naturally, debt and risk
proxies, “Lev” and “Beta”, have an inverse
relation with firm’s credit ratings. Furthermore,
all of the variance inflation factor values are
less than 10, indicating that multicollinearity
is not a concern. Hair, Black, Babin, and
Anderson (2010) and Kennedy (2003) have
stated that postestimation variance inflation
factor values that do not exceed a 10-point
benchmark can be considered as a good
signal of no serious multicollinearity among
the study variables.
Before we conducted the multivariate tests,
we performed some assumption tests to address
possible regression issues. As demonstrated in
Table 5, we can safely conclude that there is no
major problem related to heteroscedasticity
(Breusch-Pagan x2 ¼ 0.71 and p ¼ .39),

Note. Estimated variance inflation factor values that are less than the 10.00-point benchmark demonstrates that multicollinearity is not an issue across the variables.
***p ¼ .001. **p ¼ .01. *p ¼ .05.

1.00
0.26**

1.00

1.19
1.82
1.95
5.11
2.03
20.09
1.00
20.27**
0.25**
1.00
20.17* 20.06
0.39***
1.00
0.28** 20.16
20.35*** 20.18*
0.07
20.06
0.11
0.53***
0.05
20.04
20.27** 20.08
0.14
20.10
20.43***
0.00
0.12
20.09
20.09
0.03
0.08
0.77***
0.30*** 20.20*
0.22**
0.18*
0.28*** 20.14

1.00
1.00
20.22**
1.00
0.45*** 20.30***
1.00
0.00
20.24**
20.03
1.00
20.02
1.00
20.14
20.11
1.00
0.30*** 20.17*
20.11
20.02
20.46***
0.21*
20.20*
0.17
0.15
20.02
0.06
20.04
1.00
0.30***
20.20*
20.04
0.47***
0.35***
20.39***
0.47***

Rating
GIM
Lev
Capint
Size
Intcov
Loss
Return on
asset
Beta
Subord
Block
InstOwners
InstOwnPer

20.06
0.04
0.10
20.36*** 20.12
0.30***
20.30*** 20.07
0.11
0.65***
0.36*** 20.23**
20.06
0.10
20.23**

Block
Subord
Beta
ROA
Loss
Intcov
Size
Capint
Lev
GIM
Rating
Variable

TABLE 4. Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Analysis
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1.61
1.40
3.95
2.31
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Inst.
Inst.
Variance inflation
Owners OwnPer.
factor

12

normality (Shapiro Wilk W ¼ 0.99 and p ¼ .4),
serial correlation (Durbin Watson ¼ 1.89). Also,
the Ramsey’s Regression Equation Specification
Error (RESET) test provided that there are no
omitted variables in our main regression model
(F ¼ 0.26 and p ¼ .85).
Ordered Logistic Regression
Our data set is a form of unbalanced panel
data. Thus, the first part of our analysis is the
ordered logistic regression. The dependent
variables we used have more than two
categories and their values are in sequential
orders even though the latter category having a
higher value than the prior one. Because of the
nature of the proxies and variables, it is best to
apply ordered logistic regression because it will
supply greater statistical power when compared
with the multinomial logistic regression
(Garson, 2012). Given these premises, the
regression models were written as follows:
Credit Ratingit ¼ b0 þ ait þ b1 GIMit
þ b2 Levit þ b3 Capintit þ b4 Sizeit
þ b5 Intcovit þ b6 Lossit þ b7 ROAit
þ b8 Betait þ b9 Subordit þ b10 Blockit
þ b11 InstOwnersit þ b12 InstOwnPerit þ uit
ð6Þ
To simplify the regression model aggregating 12
functions of credit rating:

i
Xn h 0
b
x
Credit Ratingit ¼
þ
u
ð7Þ
it
k kit
k
where, Credit Ratingit is explained in terms of
k explanatory variables x1 . . . . . . .xk. Disturbance term uit is assumed to be uncorrelated
0
with mean zero and bk common factor to
each firm.
Table 6 reports that the entire model
including operational firm-specific and ownership characteristics is statistically significant as
indicated with the likelihood ratio chi-square
of 136.32 with p ¼ .00 when p , .05. The
positively estimated GIM index coefficient of
0.19 indicates an increased chance of higher
credit rating level. In other words, a high GIM
index increases the likelihood of being in a higher
credit rating category for the firms, and thus, less
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TABLE 5. Assumption Tests
Test

Test parameter

p

Acceptable significance level

x ¼ 0.71
F(3, 119) ¼ 0.26
W ¼ 0.989
1.89

.399
.854
.404
—

..05
..05
..05
1.50 , DW , 2.50

2

Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg for heteroscedasticity
Ramsey RESET for omitted variables
Shapiro Wilk W for normality
Durbin Watson statistics
Note. DW ¼ Durbin Watson.
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TABLE 6. Ordered Logistic Regression
Variable
GIM
Lev
Capint
Size
Intcov
Loss
Return on asset
Beta
Subord
Block
InstOwners
InstOwnPer
/cut 1
/cut 2
/cut 3
/cut 4
/cut 5
Number of observations
Likelihood ratio x2(8)
Prob . x2
Pseudo R 2

Coefficient

SE

p

Odds ratio

0.19
21.75
0.21
1.31
0.07
22.04
16.22
0.32
20.44
0.17
0.01
26.91
23.073
0.000
4.350
8.460
10.498
135
136.32
0.00
0.39

0.08
1.13
0.87
0.80
0.05
0.73
4.89
0.43
0.52
0.20
0.00
1.58

.02*
.12
.81
.10
.11
.01*
.00*
.46
.39
.39
.03*
.00*

1.20
0.17
1.24
3.71
1.08
0.13
1.11
1.38
0.64
1.18
1.01
0.00

Note. Results shown are for the final sample between 1990 and
2007. The empirical model to test the credit rating is a function of 12
control variables. The model is derived as follows: Credit Ratingit ¼
b0 þ ait þ b1 IMit þ b2 Levit þ b3 Capintit þ b4 Sizeit þ b5 Intcovit þ
b6 Lossit þ b7 ROAit þ b8 Betait þ b9 Subordit þ b10 Blockit þ b11 In
stOwnersit þ b12 InstOwnPerit þ uit . Thus, Credit Rating ¼ f ðantita
keover provisions; ownership; control variablesÞ.
*p , .05.

distress in returns for both bondholders and
shareholders. Aligned with the estimated GIM
index coefficients, “Loss,” “ROA,” and
“Instowners” variables are also positive and
statistically significant. That is, higher returns
and higher proportions of institutional owners
increase the chance of having higher credit rating
for the firms. On the contrary, “InstOwnPer.” is
negative but statistically significant. This goes
against what we predicted and this negative
coefficient could be explained as an increased
likelihood of takeover stemming from increased
institutional ownership. Cremers and Nair (2005)

found that increased ownership might create
takeover vulnerability for the firms.
Logistic Regression
To address the previously discussed nonlinearity issues related to credit ratings, we used
the logistic regression approach by applying the
same regression model because the dependent
variables in our models are binary measurements.
One of the important features of the logistic
regression is that it predicts the probability of the
response rather than the value of response as in
ordinary least regression (H. Kim & Gu, 2009;
Youn & Gu, 2010). Thus, we integrated the
logistic approach to the regression models
suggested by Stock and Watson (2003).
FðuÞ ¼

1
Where 0 , f ðuÞ , 1 and
1 þ exp 2u
ð8Þ

PðY ¼ 1jx1 ; x2 ; x3 . . . ; xk Þ
¼

1
1þ

ðe 2ðb0 þb1 x1 þb2 x2 þ ... þbk xk Þ Þ

ð9Þ

“GIM index,” “Size,” Intcov,” and “ROA”
variables are statically significant and they
have a positive relationship with credit ratings,
while institutional ownership percentage is
negatively associated with credit ratings. The
sign of the other variables (i.e., negative net
income – Loss) are also as predicted and they
are not statistically significant. That is, loss on
the income, firm’s lower interest coverage
ability, high capital intensity etc. signify a low
credit rating. Table 7 reports the logistic
regression results for the effect of the antitakeover provisions on the hospitality firms’ credit
ratings. We can extract from the omnibus test
(likelihood ratio) that our model performed
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TABLE 7. Logistic Regression
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Variable

Coefficient

SE

Wald

GIM
0.21
0.11
1.87
Lev
20.26
2.16 21.20
Capint
20.53
1.27 20.42
Size
3.04
1.29
2.35
Intcov
0.13
0.08
1.75
Loss
21.38
1.29 21.07
Return on asset
33.11
12.26
2.70
Beta
0.23
0.56
0.41
Subord
20.54
0.67 20.80
Block
0.33
0.27
1.22
InstOwners
0.00
0.01 20.35
InstOwnPer
27.22
2.15 23.36
Constant
29.01
4.92 21.83
Likelihood ratio
x2 ¼ 90.19, p ¼ .00*
2
0.49
Cox and Snell R
Nagelkerke R 2
0.65
Homer and
x2 ¼ 6.71, p ¼ .57
Lemeshow test

p

Odds
ratio

0.06
1.24
0.23
0.08
0.67
0.59
0.02* 20.96
0.08
1.14
0.28
0.25
0.01*
2.41
0.68
1.26
0.42
0.58
0.22
1.39
0.73
0.99
0.00*
0.00
0.07

Note. Results shown are for the final sample between 1990 and
2007. The empirical model to test the credit rating is a function of 12
control variables. The model is derived as follows: Credit Ratingit ¼
b0 þ ait þ b1 IMit þ b2 Levit þ b3 Capintit þ b4 Sizeit þ b5 Intcovit þ
b6 Lossit þ b7 ROAit þ b8 Betait þ b9 Subordit þ b10 Blockit þ b11 Ins
tOwnersit þ b12 InstOwnPerit þ uit : Thus, Credit Rating ¼ f ðantit
akeover provisions; ownership; control variablesÞ. In the model,
1
logistic function is defined as follows: FðuÞ ¼ 1þexp
2u Where 0 , f
(u) , 1 and PðY ¼ 1jx1 ; x2 ; x3 . . . ; xk Þ ¼ 1þðe 2ðb0 þb1 x11þb2 x2 þ· · ·þbk xk Þ Þ
*p , .05.

well since we achieved statistical significance
level of .00 when p , .05 with the high chi2
value of 90.19. In addition, the Homer and
Lemeshow test is not significant (x2 ¼ 6.71
p ¼ .57 at p , .05), which indicates a good fit
of the model. Along with the results obtained
from the fit indices, our model exhibits high
explanatory power in regard to the effects of
antitakeover provisions on the firms’ credit
ratings. Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke test
achieved high R 2 values (R 2 ¼ 0.49 and
R 2 ¼ 0.65, respectively).
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Our article’s stance is to investigate the
relation between corporate governance with
antitakeover measures as measured by GIM
index and the quality of credit ratings of
hospitality firms in the United States. Also, we
explained the role of shareholder rights on the

credit ratings of those firms. Overall, the
regression analyses demonstrate a positive
and significant relation between firms’ GIM
index and the credit ratings as assigned by
S&P’s long-term issuer chart. Specifically, our
findings and results display that antitakeover
measures increase the likelihood of getting
better credit ratings for hospitality firms.
Findings from mainstream finance journals
indicate lower coefficients as compared with
our results. For example, the ordered logit
result of Ashbaugh-Skaife and colleagues
(2006) is 0.037, while our result is 0.19.
Similarly, their logistic analysis result is 0.067
while our result is 0.21, indicating that
antitakeover measures have a much higher
effect on hospitality firms compared with
overall firms. Moreover, the odds ratio for
GIM indicates that every unit increase in GIM
increases the odds of having an investment
grade by 23.50%. The probability calculation,
where all other independent variables are held
at their constant mean values, shows that
increasing GIM value from 3 to 15 (lowest and
highest values in hospitality firms) increases the
probability of getting an increased investment
grade from 33.80% to 86.50%. This is an
indication that increasing GIM value yields
higher probabilities of getting investment grade
instead of speculative grade in hospitality firms’
credit ratings.
The existing literature in regard to
antitakeover measures and firms’ performance
still yields tangled results. This might be
the result of different approaches, such as
different time periods, industry focus, and
statistical procedures. When we consider
the bondholder’s perspective, the results may
become clearer and help us understand
this important part of the governance
relationship. There is an ongoing discussion
that not all provisions in governance structure
benefit every stakeholder. In that way, we
show that stronger shareholder rights are
observed differently for bondholders compared with equityholders.
In capital-intensive industries as hospitality
industry, factors affecting to access to the capital
have immense importance. Even slight changes
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in firms’ credit ratings might reduce or
eliminate the possibility of realizing desired
profits and enhancing the shareholder’s value.
Therefore, corporate governance is considered
one of the most important factors in determining the credit rating of the firm. As we can see
from the results, antitakeover provisions are an
essential and significant predictor of a hospitality firm’s credit rating quality. Governance
mechanisms could be used to assess and
reduce both default risk and agency costs.
We can then conclude that firms with stronger
governance could be associated with better
credit ratings and relatively lower interest rates
as a result.
IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND
FUTURE RESEARCH
Findings of this article add additional
support and valuable extension to the understanding of how firms’ corporate governance
and ownership characteristics affect their credit
rating quality and shareholders’ (i.e., bondholders) investment utility. One of the most
intriguing take away from the results is that
hospitality firms can restructure their risk levels
by reestablishing their governance mechanisms
driven by their board expertise. Given that
well-established governance activities along
with a strong ownership concentration will
minimize the unfavorable side of information
asymmetry between internal and external
stakeholders, agency costs will also be
reduced. Strong governance mechanisms start
with providing timely and reliable corporate
financial information for outside investors.
When corporate financial messages are conveyed at the right time, potential outside
investors will be able to create their investment
portfolios more accurately and efficiently. For
example, by analyzing many factors (e.g., firm’s
capital structure, shareholder rights, accountability, transparency), those investors (either
individual or institutional) could add more
economic value to the firm with their
investments.
Because hospitality firms are capitalintensive firms with high volatility in earnings
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and cash flows, debt is a major source of
capital for them and critical element for their
credit ratings. Our results suggest that weak
governance with lacking board expertise,
mixed control, and board independence (i.e.,
board stock ownership with low institutional
and high internal ownerships) can result in
firms incurring higher debt financing costs.
Parallel to this, those firms might also
experience lower credit ratings on their new
debt issues, which increase default risks for
bondholders. As a result, creating operational
strategies, which will yield optimized financial
outcomes for both managements and investors, will be very difficult for the policy makers.
For instance, managements have to follow a
balanced wealth transfer strategy for the
bondholders and stockholders. If the management supports positive net present value (NPV)
projects more than focusing on generating
adequate cash flows, bondholders bear greater
risk that their fixed contractual claims on the
firm’s cash flows will not be paid since future
cash flow distribution will be lower. In this
case, shareholders potentially are better off
until the shareholder rights are weakened to
make the bondholders happy. However, firms’
financial performance will take different stakes
which will cause speculative investment grade
on firms’ bonds. Taken all together, the strength
in governance provisions will mostly likely
bring solid credit rating score with reduced cost
of borrowing and capital, leverage, default and
bankruptcy risk, and negative investment
sentiment to the firms.
Our study examined publicly traded
hospitality firms. However, because many
firms in hospitality industry are privately
owned, the analyses can be extended by
including those firms with the data availability.
Furthermore, we used the GIM index in our
study. However, there are also different
governance measurements such as, the
entrenchment index created by Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) and the Institutional
Shareholder Services governance index used by
Brown and Caylor (2006). Those indices with
different proxies for corporate governance are
used in some studies. For example, stock
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ownership of corporate board, separation of
chief executive officer and chairman, and
board independence are used as corporate
governance proxies in mainstream finance
papers (i.e., Bhagat, Carey, & Elson, 1999;
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Imhoff, 2003).
Different governance indices and variables
could be further analyzed to investigate
different aspects of the relation between
governance and credit ratings in the hospitality
industry.
Even with these limitations, evidences
presented in this article developed an extensive
outlook for the decision makers of hospitality
firms in terms of corporate governance and
credit ratings. Thus, they should supply key
explanations of corporate decision-making
process for both practice and existing corporate
governance literature.
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